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THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF GAME THEORY 
 
Martin Shubik 




A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 
1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where 
some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a 
minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The 
purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and 
application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it 
stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good 
theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an 
appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the 
abstract investigation of all of them. 
 
Keywords: Game theory, Application and theory, Social sciences, Law, Experimental 
gaming, conflict, Coordination and cooperation 
 
JEL Classification: C7, C9 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to present an overview of the theory of games. 
Game theory has been a victim of its own successes. It is now firmly entrenched as a 
method of analysis as an important tool in economics, political science, law, social psy-
chology and other disciplines. This overview attempts to indicate the probable directions 
of development and to suggest where some of the challenges lie ahead. 
A broad sketch of many of the current areas of specialization is given with no attempt 
at an in-depth discourse on the proliferation of subspecializations. 
The stress is on what we may want and expect for the future, keeping in mind the 




There are many subdisciplines in game theory. The boundaries among them are not firm, 
but fuzzy and there is a considerable mix involving, substantive areas such as law or 
economics. Conversational, as well as formal game theory, still abounds and this is not 
merely indicative of preformal investigation prior to formal modeling; but even more 
importantly it shows that in everyday business and politics the language of game theory is 
influencing practitioners and the public in general about the concepts of strategic 
analysis. 
The first listing below touches on areas where formal models already exist, and 
special results have been obtained. The second listing below indicates substantive topics 
where game theoretic applications have been utilized. In each instance one or a few 
references are noted as early papers or exemplars of work in that specialty.  
 
2.1. High Abstraction, with Some Fairly Clearly Formalized Contexts 
1. Cooperative solution theory [1, 2, 3, 4] 
2. Bargaining theory [5, 6, 7, 8] 
3. Noncooperative theory [9, 10] 
4. Assignment problems [11, 12, 13] 
5. Preference theory and its relationship with game theory [14, 15] 
6. Game theory as pure mathematics [16, 17] 
7. Voting theory [3, 18, 19, 20] 
8. Incomplete knowledge of rules of the game [21, 22] 
9. Dynamic games [23, 24] 
10. Asymmetric information and Agency theory [25, 26, 27] 
11. Mechanism design [28, 29, 30] 
12. Theory of incomplete contracts [31,32, 77] 
13. Evolutionary game theory [34, 35 ] 
14. Network games [38] 
15. Agents with limited abilities [35 71] 
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16. Game theory and computer science [36, 38, 55, 56] 
17. Finance [39] 
Although the distinction is not tight all of the topics noted above, have and can be, for 
the most part studied with out a heavy investment in empirical material. Every one of 
them can claim at least a loose descriptive connection to some set of empirical problems, 
however the development of the mathematical structures and the stress on theorem 
proving are not necessarily in close coordination with applied and institutionally rich 
problems. 
The topics noted below, in contrast to most of the above have a higher institutional 
content. A safe rule of thumb in the behavioral sciences is that anything involving 
dynamics requires a description of the carrier of the process and that carrier include the 
environment of an ecology, the institutions of a society, or the organisms of a biological 
structure. 
 
2.2. Context-rich Studies 
A broad sweep of the context rich studies include: 
1. Oligopoly theory [40, 41, 42] 
2. New Industrial Organization [42] 
3. Experimental gaming [44, 45, 46, 47] 
4. Operational gaming and mechanism testing [48] 
5. Political science [ 49, 50, 51, 52, 53] 
6. Evolutionary game theory and biology [54 ] 
7. Macroeconomics [57] 
8. Theory of money and financial institutions [58, 59, 60, 61] 
9.  Operations research: duels, military O.R. [62, 63, 64] 
10. Law [65, 66, 67, 68] 
11. Psychology [44] 
12.  Anthropology and Sociology [69] 
13. Theology [70] 
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The references above, given the range of topics are clearly eclectic and sparse. For 
example, there are many thousands of articles on the Prisoners’ Dilemma alone. Further-
more, there are many experiments than can equally well be classified as publications in 
psychology, as well as social psychology. The classification of the literature on sociology 
and anthropology is difficult. It is easy to find lip service paid to the ideas of game 
theory, but difficult to find articles where one could say that game theoretic analysis was 
central to the sociological or anthropological analysis. 
The next two sections are devoted to a few comments on a selection of the topics 
noted. 
 
3. PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS 
Before formal theory can be developed for any of the topics noted a few comments are 
made on the nature of some of the basic assumptions that must be implicitly or explicitly 
taken as given. They are, for most part 
Assumptions concerning:  
AGENTS 
a. What constitutes a player: individual, formal organization, etc.? 
b. Individual rationality 
c. Preference structure 
d. Ability to perceive 
e. Ability to compute 
f. Any aspects of personality? 
Assumptions concerning: 
RULES OF THE GAME AND CONTEXT 
a. Are there formal or informal rules? 
b. Are they fixed or do they evolve? 
c. Is there un-modeled context outside of the game that matters? 
d. Does language matter? 
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Assumptions concerning:  
INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP BEHAVIOR 
a. Are the players hardwired automata? 
b. Are the players anonymous individuals playing an individual game against a 
Leviathan or mass societal phenomenon? 
c. Do the players form coalitional groups with direct interpersonal bargaining 
and communication? 
Clearing away this modeling underbrush, the modelers utilizing the many facets of 
game theory usually break their investigations into three broad classes.1 
The three classes are game theory models and solutions where: 
1. The extensive form or some variant is taken as given. 
2. The strategic form or some variant is taken as given. 
3. The coalitional form or some variant is taken as given. 
Commenting broadly: 
The extensive form is used for problems involving explicit concern with dynamics and 
process. At the most precise and constrained it is used to formulate mathematically highly 
challenging problems such as two person constant-sum multi-stage games with non-
symmetric information. At the other extreme, in one form or another, it is used for “soft 
game theory” dominated with general intuitive discussion about multistage games where 
the order of moves may not be known as in “soft gaming” such as politico-military 
exercises (PME) or operational war games. 
Soft extensive form is the domain of verbal applications to diplomacy and even 
theology. These “soft games” provide a rich location where application, operational 
planning and theory meet. This is where the practical men and women of the world, such 
as top bureaucrats, industrialists, generals, diplomats, and politicians can challenge each 
other and the theorists in exercises aimed at challenging both practice and theory. 
 
                                                 
1 These variants often split into many sub variants as notational considerations emphasizing one or another 
feature of the specific problem at hand call for modification of the usual extensive, strategic or coalitional 
forms.  
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The strategic form is most heavily used in elementary exposition of game theory and in 
many economic applications. “A zero sum-game” is now a term in common speech. In 
spite of the challenge by Harsanyi and Selten to explain all cooperative games within a 
structure of noncooperative theory this program has not succeeded and it is my belief it 
will not succeed. 
The coalitional form is especially dedicated towards the study of bargaining, coalitional 
formation and cooperative behavior. As noncooperative theory swept the field in many 
applications, cooperative theory virtually disappeared from many textbooks. But in spite 
of many premature reports of its impending death it still appears to be flourishing 
especially with the core and various value solutions. 
 
4. OPEN QUESTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this section, a few questions are considered looking towards the future. 
There are many solutions suggested for dynamic games, repeated matrix games with 
and without uncertainty, or games in some variant of the extensive form with various 
terminal conditions. There is no single universally accepted solution. There may be 
many solutions that appear to be reasonable if judged from a specific context point of 
view. As von Neumann intimated any good applied mathematics has its assumption or 
axioms rooted in observation. The relationship between context and the concept of 
solution is critical 
 
4.1. Solutions to Games in Extensive Form 
In the development of multistage games; one must ask what are the questions to be 
answered? One question might be the proof of the existence of a unique equilibrium point 
for all games played by agents fitting into the often used model of the rational economic 
agent. This dispenses with the utilization of much psychology or social-psychology. For 
many applications of dynamic game theory it appears that at least one, if not many 
models of a behavioral agent with limits on perception, intelligence, ability to remem-
ber, ability to compute, and ability to act is called for. This has posed one of the greatest 
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difficulties in the development of a viable applied dynamics in many topics. Needed is a 
mixture of gaming, game theory, cognitive psychology and social psychology. This is 
emerging, but at this time is far from fully developed. It depends on a joint understanding 
among professionals in different disciplines that has hardly been developed. 
A key specific example is provided concerning the role of threats and the relevance of 
perfect equilibria. It is easy to run an experiment illustrating that in some contexts 
individuals in an experimental game do not select the obvious unique perfect equilibrium. 
 
Figure 1: Threat Equilibria 
 
4.2. Backward and Forward Planning: Recall and Strategy 
Explicit forward planning is heavily short term. It rarely exceeds five years into the 
future. Longer range plans are almost always revised before five years have passed. 
Much of memory is episodic, depending on “events that stand out.” These observations 
indicate that more investigation is called for, of multistage games played with updating 
strategies where individual look back no further than T1 periods and project forward no 
more than T2 periods where at most 4 or 5 years are considered. In business School and 
Corporate Planning literature there has been considerable work on planning processes. 
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Almost all of it is evolutionary. The projections are revised as the environment changes. 
This work is currently far from formal game theory. 
 
4.3. Modeling Expertise 
In the game of Go (and to a lesser extent in chess) there is a substantial literature on 
expertise, complete with a handicapping system that enables individuals with different 
expertise to play each other on a more or less evened up basis. This alone is sufficient to 
indicate the importance of expertise. 
As long ago as in 1947 von Neumann and Morgenstern [76, p. 614] considered 
bargaining with different refinements of perception. 
Within the current formal structure of the extensive form it is easy to model one 
rudimentary form of expertise by giving one individual a strict refinement of the 
information possessed by her competitor. An example of a simple classroom game shows 
that finer perception can be modeled as a refinement of information and its influence on 




It is my belief that the role of expertise calls for considerable collaborative work in 
both of game theory and psychology. Even a casual glance at society and the economy 
illustrates that for many basic questions expertise, experience and superior perception 
cannot be ignored. 
 
4.4. The Role of Language 
A critical, but as yet lightly studied aspect of game theory has been the treatment of 
language and gesture. Some consideration has been given to “cheap talk” and to costly 
information but chiefly because it is extremely difficult and probably requires 
interdisciplinary collaboration the role of language is virtually ignored in the current 
development of game theory [but see 78, 79]. Although verbal communication and 
language as a coordinating device, have been recognized for many years in actual 
behavior. Expressions such as “a man of his word” or “his word is his bond” raise deep 
questions in the analysis of threats and bargaining. 
I conjecture that even permitting a highly restricted formal set of messages associated 
with even mild penalties for “failing to live up to your word,” can start to show some of 
the features of language in game theory. 
 
4.5. Mass Player Game Theory and Mass Particle Physics? How Good Is the 
Analogy? 
What is meant by many? How many is many? How much is it context dependent? 
It is easy to comment in lectures on analogies between physics or biology and 
economics. The mass particle methods of physics may appear to be highly attractive to 
those economists concerned with mass anonymous markets. But in asking “how many is 
many? Fundamental differences appear among particles in physics, people in economics 
and cells in biology. In human affairs 10e10 covers the world population of humans with 
some room to spare. In physics and biology 10e10 can easily be a small number a small 
number. 
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The nature of communication among individuals and among atoms is sufficiently 
different to require us to use the analogies with care. Is the “madness of mobs” and 
example analogous to polarization of particles [80]? How far does the analogy stretch and 
how useful is it? The burgeoning topic of network game theory may be of relevance. 
We may expect that experimental gaming and simulation will flourish, in the 
investigation of mass behavior games, utilizing simulation and agent-based modeling to 
beat through otherwise intractable heterogeneous population models [37]. 
 
4.6. The Games within the Game 
At one level, at least in political-economy the relationship between much of economic 
decision-making and political decision — making is, that to a considerable extent, the 
political decision-making takes place on a different time scale than the economic 
decision-making and the politics provides many of the rules and context for the 
economics. It is reasonable to consider that there is a game within a game. It is feasible to 
formalize a class of games where finite lived players (real persons) play in a game each 
period, but another set of players (legal persons or institutions) who can be considered 
with operationally infinite lives can modify some of the rules of the second level game 
every n periods. Structures with two or more levels of decision-making taking place on 
different time spans provide a setting where the influence of the polity on the economy 
and vice-versa can both be modeled and may eventually serve to provide a more 
satisfactory paradigm to link mathematical micro-economics to macro-economics than 
general equilibrium theory [81]. 
At the least conventional GE will be replaced by a game with a continuum of agents 
and one atomic player with financial instruments included. This treated fully game 
theoretically calls for political-economy as a game within a game. The economy being 
the basically competitive game and above it the polity being the rule maker for the game 
below. My guess is that 25% ± 5% is the “energy or money” consumption required by an 
elected government for a viable political economy. This is roughly like the energy 
consumption of the brain relative to the body [82]. 
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It is worth noting that with this structure a mass of individual local optimizers could 
drive an evolving system that is continuously modifying the rules for the local optimizers 
with the system as a whole having no particular direction. 
 
4.7. On Matrix Games, Cooperative and Noncooperative Theories 
In Section 4.4 the games within the game were noted, basically with respect to economics 
and political science. Here it is suggested that it is possible that at a far higher level of 
abstraction the possibility of the relevance of a multistage organism may be implicit 
within the n-matrix representation of a game in strategic form. Although the generic 
inefficiency of the Noncooperative Equilibrium has been proved [72], to my knowledge 
few attempts [83, 84] have been made trying to measure how inefficient is the NCE in 
comparison with the cooperative game approach of von Neumann and Morgenstern that 
utilized measurable transferable utility. A way to approach this problem is to place the 
utility comparisons on the same level; thereby enabling one to sum the payoffs at any 
equilibrium point. In utilizing this approximation one can define the upper and lower 
bounds on the set of noncooperative equilibrium points associated with any matrix game 
and thus consider the upper and lower bounds to measure by what percentage the NCE 
falls short of the joint maximum (JM). This measure provides an indication of the 
resource gain available to all agents by switching to a cooperative game. But instead of 
switching to the cooperative game per se if the gap were large enough the agents could 
construct a mechanism in the form of a second stage to the game that provides 
coordination, signaling and possibly some other forms of control on the original matrix 
game in such a way that the players can pay for the administrative costs and still all be 
able to benefit from its existence. This might be regarded as a reconciliation between the 
benefits of unlimited individual behavior and a higher level of organization. 
 
4.8. Voting or Evaluating Candidates 
There is a considerable literature on voting and public choice replete with measures: 
impossibility results; and different voting structures suggested. In spit of Arrow’s [53] 
 12
elegant extension of Condorcet’s paradox, all that an impossibility theorem does is force 
us to ask if we have the right domain and the right description of the players and the right 
concept of solution. Recently a method has been suggested that places the stress on 
evaluating and grading the candidates rather than voting for them in a conventional 
manner [52]. 
 
4.9. Agent Based Modeling and Simulation 
Purely analytical methods in the behavioral sciences are usually of great help if one can 
get them. But their use is by no means an easy goal to achieve. This is especially true if 
one wishes to consider heterogeneous agents. The growth of simulation methods and the 
cheapness and speed of computation are beginning to provide the behavioral sciences 
with a new form of viewing device akin to the telescope and microscope in other 
sciences. The computer provides not only a means for computation, but a means for 
investigation in the behavioral sciences whether the simulation involves different types of 
optimizing agents or minimal intelligence automata, animal fights, market struggles or 
political voting contests, multi-agent models can be constructed and employed to provide 
insights and to sweeten the intuition in a way that even a decade ago was unthinkable. 
These methods have been developing with increasing speed (see Epstein and Axtell 
[37]; the Santa Fe Institute double auction [73]. The Game of Life [74] to name a few). 
But they will often (but not always) be best utilized when linked with clear questions and 
analytical concern. Given the considerable difficulty in developing good analytical 
models of capacity constrained agents [85] the possibilities for game theory to benefit 
from automata simulations are considerable. 
 
4.10. Computer Science, Game Theory, Combinatorics and Computation 
The last topic noted is computer science and game theory. Anyone who has considered 
the proliferation of the number of alternative structures represented by matrix games 
knows that even the number of 2 x 2 games is imposingly large. Although in much of 
elementary teaching a handful of special games such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the 
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Battle of the Sexes, or the Stag Hunt play prominent roles in illustrating principles and 
paradoxes.  
If we limit ourselves to strong ordinal preferences, just for the 2 x 2 matrix there are 
4!*4! = 576 games that can be generated. Considerations of symmetry can reduce this 
large number to a somewhat more manageable 144 (or for some purposes [78]). But even 
if one only weakens assumptions on preferences to include ties the number of different 
games jumps to 44 * 44 = 65,536 games. By symmetry considerations they can be reduced 
to 726 strategically different games. However the class of all 3 x 3 matrix games is 
already hyper-astronomical; but in order to understand the gap between individual non-
coordinated behavior and correlated or cooperative behavior one needs to consider 
general domains such as the set of all k x k games. At this point methods of 
combinatorics and computer science are called for. Even simple questions such as finding 
if there exits a NCE that yields a payoff larger than some number for each player was 
shown to be NP-complete [75]. A useful survey has been provided by Halpern [76] 
covering bounded rationality, the computation of Nash equilibria and algorithmic 
mechanism design, adding to the usual economic discussions of mechanism design the 
estimates of computational requirements. 
There is a similarity between the problems noted in Sections 4.6 and 4.7 above and 
the investigation of the price of anarchy considered in computer science. 
It is my belief that work at this intersection of disciplines will proliferate in the next 
decade a part of the intermix between computation and conceptualization of new 
problems in game theory, combinatorics and computer science. 
 
5. REPRISE 
Only a few of the many topics noted in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above have been discussed 
here. All of them are still expected to grow, many with increasing rates. An article 
attempting to provide anything more than superficial commentary on these many 
flourishing sub-disciplines would probably require more than 70 or 80 pages. 
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In the 1950s, when I was deeply impressed by the power of the formal models and the 
mathematics of game theory, I underestimated the importance of what I have called 
conversational game theory and its loose connections with operational gaming. The many 
subtle features of human behavior are not going to be mathematized easily, if at all. There 
is little doubt that a considerable amount of formal mathematics must still be developed; 
but not at the cost of cutting off the developers from understanding the reality they 
believe that the mathematics is meant to be portraying. In order to stay in touch with the 
various realities of application the game theorists must set up and maintain a dialogue 
with the practitioners. It is a two way street. Theory may influence practice, but practice 
must influence the development the appropriate models if the subject is to be more than 
an exercise in a minor branch of pure mathematics. A contact with the many realities of 
the politicians, entrepreneurs, financiers, generals, philosophers, religious leaders, hard 
and social scientists is an absolute must. The appropriate models cannot be built without 
an understanding of context and both the models and their formal analysis are called for 
to bring the influence of theory into the domain of public discourse and appreciation. 
In this brief overview only a few less obvious items have been noted, but as the 70th 
anniversary of the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
approaches the speed of growth in both theory and applications is still accelerating. The 
applications are more varied and are forcing us towards more and more collaborations 
across all of the behavioral sciences in general and, in my opinion in biology and in 
computer science in particular. 
Although the discussion here has been primarily concerned with the present and 
future, it is desirable to have at least, some understanding of the past. Recently a 
stimulating study of the precursors to the development of game theory has been provided 
by Robert Leonard [86] in his writing on Von Neumann, Morgenstern and the Creation of 
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